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GEORGE J. STIGLER
THE Conference on Business Concentration and Price Policy was
held at Princeton University, June 17-19,1952. Theconference was
organized, under the sponsorship of the Universities—National Bu-
reau Committee for Economic Research, by a steering committee
consisting of Corwin Edwards, Carl Kaysen, Edward S. Mason,
George J. Stigler, chairman, and Clair Wilcox; and Gideon Rosen-
bluth was the (I must gratefully say, highly efficient) secretary. The
papers and discussions in this volume have been revised since they
were delivered.
One task that economists have long taken seriously is that of ex-
plaining what determines the behavior of an industry. Under what
conditions do prices fall(or rise) with expansion of output? How
does the industry change its methods of production in response to
changes in prices of inputs? When will customers be classified and
each class asked to pay a different price? Will relatively large profits
lead to an increase in the number of firms and, if so, how rapidly?
Such questions—to which many economists would like to add less-
studied questions such as: How does industry structure affect the
rate of technological advance?—are at the center of modern eco-
nomic analysis.
When one turns to the empirical investigation of such questions,
he must at the outset determine what industries are.(Most em-
pirical studies have dealt almost exclusively with manufacturing
industries, and we shall follow this regrettable tradition here.) Al-
most invariably the empirical workers have accepted, perhaps with
minor modifications such as Rosenbiuth applies to the Canadian
data, the practices of the census officials who compile the data. They
cannot be blamed: the task of appraising the relevance of census
classifications to questions of industrial organization is so vast that
it would swallow up any more specific investigation the economist
had in mind.
Moreover, it is not obvious that the census classification is inap-
propriate to our interests, which here center in questions of compe-
tition and monopoly. Conklin and Goldstein summarize the princi-
ples of the present classification. These principles rest fundamentally
upon similarity of products or production processes of establishments
(plants) which are to be combined into one industry. Particular
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attention is paid to supply conditions, and "the industry gener-
ally represents a group of close competitors, producing close sub-
stitute commodities." Homogeneity is sought: most of the products
attributed to the industry must be accounted for by the estab-
lishments in the industry, and most of the products of the estab-
lishments in the industry must fall into the industry defined by its
major products. The fact that in the application of such rules to
specific industries, census bureaus are influenced by opinions of
businessmen, demands of other government agencies, etc., insures
that the classifications are not insulated from business experience
and public policy.
Yet the rules are intrinsically ambiguous. Economists have writ-
ten acres on the problem of defining the closeness of substitute prod.
ucts, and no doubt problems of equal complexity are encountered in
estimating the similarity of production processes. The influence of
business attitudes and public policy is also not an unmixed blessing,
for the classifications that are germane to taxation, labor problems,
tariffs, and the like are not necessarily suitable to the analysis of
problems of competition and monopoly.
Price theory has certain direct implications for this problem of
defining industries that have not received adequate recognition in
official practice, and they deserve at least brief comment here. An
industry should embrace the maximum geographical area and the
maximum variety of productive activities in which there is strong
long-run substitution. If buyers can shift on a large scale from prod-
uct or area B to A, then the two should be combined. If pro-
ducers can shift on a large scale from B to A, again they should
be combined.
Economists usually state this in an alternative form: All prod-
ucts or enterprises with large long-run cross-elasticities of either
supply or demand should be combined into a single industry. In
this form it is perhaps forbidding to the statistical worker, for gen-
erally cross-elasticities are calculated from empirical equations re-
lating quantity supplied or demanded of one commodity to a
host of prices, and we do not have—and cannot in the reasonable
future expect to get—enough of these equations to base a general
census upon them. But much more feasible methods of detecting
substitution exist. If establishments making wooden office furni-
ture in one year shift in considerable numbers within a year or two
to making metal office furniture, this is conclusive evidence of high
supply substitution—and can be measured with information now
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collected but not published. If numerous buyers of cardboard ship-
ping containers in one year are found to be buyers of wooden or
burlap containers soon thereafter, thisis conclusive evidence of
high demand substitution—and can be measured with the type of
information now collected.
One important application of the rule of high substitution is to
international trade. If a commodity is on either an export or an
import basis, its concentrationS should usually be measured for a
market larger than the domestic area. If the commodity is on an
export basis, foreign buyers have alternative sources of supply,
which must be included in the "industry"; if it is on an import
basis, domestic buyers have alternative domestic supply sources,
which again should be combined with the foreign supply. In either
case it is necessary to take account of the industry structure abroad,
but this extension of the area of work of the Bureau of the Census
may not be objectionable to its staff.'
Once supplied with the frequency distribution of firms by size
within properly defined industries, how shall we measure concen-
tration? The large-scale statistical studies have so far employed
measures that are directly formed by the disclosure rules of cen-
suses. Despite Rosenbiuth's welcome assurance that it does not
seem to matter whether we take the proportion of the industry's
output coming from the largest three, four, or other small number
of firms or the number of firms required to account for, say, three-
quarters of the industry's output, we can be certain of one defect
in the calculation of these measures. It lies in the time period.
One of Marshall's greatest contributions to economics was to
show that calendar time units are seldom a proper basis for meas-
uring economic forces and to elaborate a schema of short- and
long-run periods which were defined in terms of the forces which
dominate them. The classification was especially relevant to com-
petitive industries because long-run forces can usually be assumed
to be negligible in the short run. Under monopoly, however, long-
run forces may be decisive even in the short run because the monop-
olist reaps a large share or all of the future effects of his current
policies. A good concentration measure (like a good industry con-
cept) should relate to the long run. This has always been recognized
1Theproblem of the market area is greatly complicated if tariffs or quotas
permit price discrimination between domestic and foreign markets, except in
the extreme case when the two markets are completely independent and must be
treated separately.
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implicity; no one has ever said that concentration rises in late
afternoon as eastern factories close down.
The long run is defined in terms of the period necessary for speci-
fied changes to take place, and two such changes or forces seem spe-
cially significant in studies of monopoly. One is on the demand
side: How long a time is required for buyers to move along their
long-run demand curves? If buyers can make fairly complete ad-
justments to prices only by such time-consuming procedures as mov-
ing their plants or radically modifying them, this period may be of
several years' duration. The second force is on the supply side: How
long a time is required for outsiders to detect large profits and to
enter the industry? Normally I would expect this period to be at
least as short as the demand period (although this conjecture has
hardly any empirical basis) if no conventional barriers to entry,
such as patents and raw material control, exist. Clearly calendar
length of the long run may vary widely among industries.
Since the long-run forces may require a fairly long period of cal-
endar time to work themselves out, one might infer that concentra-
tion measures should be calculated for periods of, say, five years.
But against this must be put the consideration that the long run
does not always completely dominate the short run:it may be
sensible, for example, to behave monopolistically for a few years
and then to lose one's monopolistic position. It is one of the tasks
of empirical research to determine the relative roles of these argu-
ments,2 and I should think that we ought to have concentration
measures calculated for three, five, and possibly even ten years, as
well as for the inevitable one year.
The other question remains: Which parameters of the frequency
distribution of firm sizes are relevant to the behavior of the in-
dustry? The relative output of a small number of firms, which is
now used, is surely one relevant parameter, although most of the
proof for this assertion still lies in the formal theory of oligopoly
and not in empirical studies. Until we get the empirical studies, we
are not likely to progress far in the refinement qf concentration
measures. Itis easy enough to introduce additional parameters
whose relevance to the behavior of the industry can be plausibly
argued: for example, I would expect to find also that the absolute
number of firms and the degree of instability in the shares of the
2 From the viewpoint of social policy, short-run monopolies are of course much
less important, and—with present durations of antitrust court actions—almost
beyond control.
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largest firms from year to year were important in influencing the
industry's behavior. But plausibility is at least as much an effect of
skillful argument as an evidence of probability of truth in an area
as complicated and unexplored as oligopoly, and there is little point
in multiplying such parameters at the present time.
Scitovsky properly emphasizes the fact that our interest in con-
centration is not restricted to its effects on the allocation of re-
sources among firms—the traditional focus of the theory of monop-
oly. We are also interested in the effects of concentration on the
distribution of income, the distribution of political power, the
efficiency with which resources are used within the firm, etc. Wholly
different measures of concentration may be called for in the em-
pirical study of these other facets of the monopoly problem. The
relationship of monopoly to the distribution of income, for ex-
ample, surely involves the absolute sizes of firms and the distribu-
tion of ownership of monopolies. Important as these other problems
are, however, one may still argue that the traditional focus on the
power of the firm in the market is basic, for if this power is absent
all the other problems vanish (as monopoly problems).
Miller examines an important deficiency in the traditional theory
of monopoly, from which the concentration studies stem. The neo-
classical theory of competition and monopoly was developed with
two paramount objectives: to provide a clear and consistent theory
of economic behavior, and to be analytically manageable. Both of
these objectives were met fairly well by defining competition in
terms of a stationary economy—one in which consumers' tastes, pro-
duction techniques, and productive resources were stable through
time. The resulting theory is immensely useful in a wide range of
economic problems; but itis not directly applicable to problems
raised by economic development—the rapid growth, and frequently
unpredictable changes, in consumer demands and productive tech-
niques and resources.
Schumpeter has sketched with great brilliance the possible para-
doxes in applying the theory of stationary economies to historical
developments.3 The argument is weighty and clearly poses the prob-
lem of constructing a definition of competition which is suited to
firms in a changing economy. Schumpeter's "solution," which was
to label as monopoly all departures from perfect competition in a
stationary society, is not useful. Real progress in this area seems also
SJosephA. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Soczalum, and Democracy (Harper, 1942),
Chaps.vI-ix.
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to demand that incisive empirical work for which economists so
monotonously beg. But I suspect that when our knowledge of eco-
nomic growth has increased, we shall not be called upon to reverse
all the conclusions reached by stationary analysis.
Let us put aside these and other possible complications and re-
turn to the concentration of industry. Industries vary greatly in
their concentration, and we naturally seek to learn why. Three
papers in this volume deal with important forces affecting concen-
tration: the economies of scale, mergers, and taxation.
Since Cournot's time it has been recognized that at most only a
few firms can usually survive in an industry in which the average
cost of production of a firm declines as its size increases, and even
today this is the popular explanation for concentration. Smith has
summarized recent work on this subject, including the interesting
efforts to estimate the costs of firms of different sizes from techno-
logical relationships between inputs and outputs. This latter type
of approach has many attractions, especially in studies of the social
(in contrast to private) economies of scale. But it also has two major
defects. One defect is generally recognized: the method cannot be
extended to selling, recruiting labor, financing, etc. Another defect
is not always recognized: the economist is "solving" the problem of
measuring economies of scale by turning it over to someone else,
and yet it is fundamentally an economic problem.
Smith shows how difficult the problems of measurement are, even
though he does not emphasize the point (the valuation of inputs)
that I find most troublesome. Difficulty is not an adequate reason
for abandoning a problem, but I think there are some positive rea-
sons for determining economies of scale from changes in concentra-
tion over time rather than using economies to explain concentra-
tion. That is, those firm-sizes whose outputs are growing relative to
the industry may be interpreted as having the lowest (private) costs.
All comprehensive definitions of economies of scale ultimately im-
ply that firms with the lowest costs prosper relative to other sizes of
firms, and it is desirable to recognize this explicitly by defining the
most efficient size as that which grows relative to other sizes. This
interpretation does not inhibit research on the factors that lead to
concentration, for one may still investigate the influence of plant
size, of advertising, of the nature of the product, etc. In fact, I would
consider it a merit of the reformulation that it divides a vast and
complex problem into a series of more specific and manageable
problems.
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The merger of firms within an industry (putting aside "vertical"
mergers) has been a major force in changing the firm structure of
many industries. Mergers provide an interesting problem in meas-
urement because of the peculiar basis for recording them: mergers
leading to large firms, and acquisitions of all sizes of firms by firms
that are already large, constitute the elements of newsworthiness
which leads the financial press_and thus the historians of mergers
—to record them. Absolute size, moreover, is commonly the test of
"large" firms, although size relative to the industry is more relevant
to questions of industrial structure. Because large firms are neces-
sarily relatively few in number, perhaps on the order of one merger
in a hundred is recorded, and the proportion no doubt varies
through time and among industries. The available historical series
on mergers, given by Markham, are thus sketchy to an extreme: long
periods(before 1887,1904-1918)have not been studied; size of
firms has not been studied, or always recorded, for the variable
points of truncation in reporting; horizontal and other mergers
have not been distinguished; the industrial composition, when re-
ported at all, is very crude; etc.
Much of the uncertainty over the causes and effects of mergers is
attributable to this lack of information. For example, some econo-
mists believe that the improvements in transportation in the dec-
ades after the Civil War were an important factor in bringing merg-
ers_chiefly because the expansion of market areas increased com-
petition. Simple tests of the hypothesis are easy to devise: mergers
should have come earlier in commodities whose production was
geographically localized and in products (like ships and jewelry) for
which transportation costs were relatively unimportant. We cannot,
with our present empirical material, apply such tests.4 A systematic
recompilation of the historical record would be a vast task, but it
would be labor well spent.5
Fifty years ago only one class of taxes was ever mentioned in
studies of industrial organization: tariffs, "the mother of the trusts."
Now taxes insist upon intruding into every branch of economic
4Onebasis for my belief that this particular explanation of mergers will not
be found useful is that England had a wave of mergers at approximately the
same time, although its regions became close-knit considerably before ours.
SWhenit is undertaken, particular attention should be paid to the timing of
the several steps in mergers. The period between the initiation of negotiations
and the formal merger or acquisition may be variable but substantial—indeed
this is one reason, I believe, why the time series show considerable erratic short-
run fluctuation.
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analysis, and in a variety of forms and with a labyrinth of technical
details sufficient to discourage casual generalization. Lintner and
Butters' survey of the effects of income and estate taxes reveals the
possibility that many significant influences on the industrial struc-
ture now flow from these taxes, and the same can be said of certain
excises, payroll taxes, etc. Students of public finance may not wel-
come this new facet of their work: it is hard enough to devise a tax
that will raise substantial revenue, be allocated equitably, counter-
act cyclical fluctuations, encourage efficiency and innovation, and
keep the party in power, without adding a due regard for the pres-
ervation of competition.
One feature of the taxes Lintner and Butters discuss is that their
effects appear to be related usually to the absolute rather than to
the relative size of firm. The effects of these taxes upon concentra-
tion would therefore appear to be more powerful in industries in
which the relatively large firms are large in absolute size, for then
substantial absolute growth is required of new rivals before they
can offer important competition (and it is absolute growth that taxes
may retard). With this in mind it is interesting to compare changes
between 1935and1947inconcentration in manufacturing indus-
tries classified by the absolute sizes of the largest firms. It would be
preferable to measure size by assets in this connection, but value
added is the most relevant measure available. The results of this
tabulation are given in the accompanying table. The decline in con-
TABLE 1
Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing Industries, '935 and 1947,
Classifiedby Average Value Added in the Four Largest Firms, '935
Per Cent of Value of Product
Value Added Produced by Four Largest Firms
per Firm in Four Number of (concentration ratio)
Largest Firms, 1935 Industries 1935 1947
Under$250,000 7 36.5 29.5
$250,000-500,000 13 42.0 39.8
500,000-750,000 14 41.7 37.7
750.000-1,000,000 10 36.4 33.8
1,000,000-2,500,000 37 43.4 42.3
2,500,000- 5,000,000 23 43.1 41.1
5,000,000-10,000,000 i6 52.6 51.0
10,000,000-25,000,000 7 6.8 66.3
25,000,000andover 4 70.7 70.7
Total
Source: The Structure of the American Economy, National Resources Corn.
mittee, 1939;Concentrationof Industry Report, Dept of Commerce, '949.
10INTRODUCTION
centration was substantial in industries where the largest firms are
absolutely small, but no decline occurred at the opposite end of the
scale. Taxation may have been one of the significant influences in
this pattern of change.
In the essays of Adelman and Edwards we leave the subject of
horizontal concentration and explore other aspects of industrial
structure. Adelman estimates by several procedures the quantitative
extent of vertical integration in differe"t firms and industries. We
customarily view vertical integration as a technological problem: if
a firm or plant produces an input it previously purchased, we say
it has become more fully integrated. One difficulty with this ap-
proach is that it is applicable only if technology is stable. The Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research recently turned over publica-
tion of its books to the Princeton University Press, so we may say
that it is now less vertically integrated. But if its researches should
be televised—I have been informed of no such plan—no degree of
program preparation corresponds to publication, so the change in
vertical integration is indeterminable.
A quantitative measure of vertical integration comparable among
industries must be monetary in nature, and the most common such
measure is the ratio of value added (roughly, receipts minus pur-
chases of materials) to value of product. This measure pertains only
to intra-establishment integration when it is calculated from census
data, and even then is subject to two serious ambiguities. The first
is that when a plant produces a variety of products, with different
ratios of value added to value, the extent of vertical integration
varies with the composition of output, even if production processes
do not change. The second ambiguity isthat census industries
frequently contain plants engaged in successive operations—motor
vehicles is an extreme example_so the value of product contains
much duplication.
Rather than enter into the problem of dealing with value-added
data, we shall be content to notice that occasionally the Census of
Manufactures reports information that is directly relevant to the
extent of vertical integration. In each census, for example, there
are reported the quantities of some commodities made and con-
sumed in the same establishment and the quantities made for sale.
Sample figures may be reproduced:
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Itmight be possible to make a general analysis of vertical integra-
tion by recasting census data in this form.
One may argue—as I would—that the fundamental basis of power
of the conglomerate firm that Edwards describes is monopoly in the
conventional sense. Some of the phenomena he describes are illus-
trations of well-known theoretical propositions, such as that indi-
vidual monopolists of goods complementary in demand will make
smaller aggregate profitsif they act independently than will a
single monopolist who takes account of the interrelationships in
demand. Again, many aspects of the large, diversified firm's ac-
tivities seem explicable if there are substantial difficulties in ac-
cumulating large amounts of equity capital; the capital market for
small firms is possibly a strategic factor in a vast array of industrial
practices.
But whatever its basis, the conglomerate firm poses new problems
also. When large firms are cooperating in relatively concentrated
industries, will they not also tend to cooperate in other industries
where concentration is so low that normally competitive behavior
would have been expected? Conversely, if the firms that are large
in one industry are medium-sized or small in other industries, may
not their differences in activity raise substantial difficulties in arriv-
ing at agreements in any one of the industries? We need to know
which of the infinitely many possible constellations of related con-
centration in several industries are of empirical significance and to
analyze their workings in detail.
Price behavior is so important an aspect of industrial behavior
that apology is required, not that the conference had several essays
in this area, but that there could not have been more. Still, the full-
cost principle, price rigidity, and price discrimination are all suffi-
ciently important, so the conference planning committee cannot be
accused of gross neglect. I shall restrict my remaining comments to
a problem on which all of these papers touch: How can one measure
the relationship of price behavior to the structure of an industry
and, in particular, to its concentration?
The output of a competitive industry is such that price equals
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long-run marginal cost. It is therefore natural to measure, or pos-
sibly even to define, the departure of an industry's price from the
competitive level by the ratio of price to long-run marginal cost.
Useful as this ratio is in the analysis of individual industries, there
is unfortunately no known method of making tolerably comparable
estimates for many industries so that one might correlate this meas-
ure with concentration data. For such broad surveys one is forced
to employ a substitute measure.
The temporal rigidity of prices, with respect to either frequency
or amplitude, has been the most popular substitute measure, and
the vast literature on its use is discussed by Ruggles. For a time,
price rigidity was hopefully taken as good evidence of noncompeti-
tive behavior, but both economic theory and statistical studies have
greatly weakened the confidence in this evidence. Monopolies may
charge flexible prices in their own interests, and competitive in-
dustries may have periods of stable supply and demand conditions.
The statistical work has shown little correlation between rigidity
and concentration, but this work has been plagued by problems of
data. Price data and production data are usually collected by dif-
ferent agencies, so that one must use (quoted) prices that are un-
certain samples of the industry's real price structure or values of
output which are influenced by changes in the composition of out-
put.6 Extreme price rigidity is inconsistent with competition, but
beyond this the association is at best weak.
Since persistent and systematic price discrimination is also in-
variably associated with noncompetitive behavior of an industry,
one might look to this area for measures. Yet price discrimination
takes on a considerable variety of forms—geographical, product
class, customer class, etc.—as the reader of Machlup's essay will be
persuaded. (Machlup is apparently more optimistic than I on the
possibility of also disentangling the motives which lead to price dis-
crimination.) Some of the forms of price discrimination deserve
study as possible bases for measures of noncompetitive behavior; in
particular, the comparison of domestic and export prices might be
feasible for a considerable number of industries.
The full-cost principle, in the only one of its numerous versions
that I shall consider, states that prices are set equal to average
variable cost plus a stable markup per unit of output. If this hy-
8Censusvalue-of-product figures are possibly seriously biased because two
components of output_interplant transfers and inventory additions—are often
valued at cost.
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pothesis is correct, we have a new measure of noncompetitive be-
havior because no competitive industry can adhere to such a formula
in the face of large fluctuations in output. But if this theory is cor-
rect, then the conventional theory of imperfect competition, which
makes demand a factor in price determination, is incorrect, and
this dispute must first be settled. The settlement—presumably by a
recourse to empirical tests—is difficult for two reasons. One is that
the full-cost theory has many versions in addition to that stated
above, as Heflebower shows, and its sponsors also differ considerably
among themselves on the factors governing the markup on variable
costs. The other difficulty is that both the conventional theory and
the full-cost theories generally agree on the most easily tested pre-
dictions: the general correspondence between movements of price
and costs, the similar movements of profits and output, etc. They
differ qualitatively only in that the conventional theory affirms, and
the full-cost theories deny, that short-run changes in demand will
affect selling price even though prices of inputs do not change.7 It
is to be hoped that proponents of the full-cost theories will soon test
its ability to predict price movements as compared with the con-
ventional theory.
These various measures of price behavior do not of course con-
stitute a complete listing.8 The available measures, however, are
usually either difficult to quantify or ambiguous in interpretation,
and much work remains to be done here. Progress in the measure-
ment of price behavior as an index of performance will in turn con-
tribute greatly to improvements in the measurement and interpre-
tation of concentration, for our interest in concentration is centered
in its effects on the behavior of industries.
TCertainless prominent differences also exist. For example, on the conventional
theory a monopolist is less concerned over the effect of current price on future
demand if the commodity is perishable, whereas the full-cost theories make no
such distinction.
8Inaddition to the popular measure, the ratio of price to average cost(or
profitability), interesting experiments have been made with differences among
firms in the level, and time and direction of change, of prices.
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